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COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION: IS THIS THE END OF
DESNY V. WILDER?
Glen L. Kulik*
I. INTRODUCTION
The pattern is familiar. It occurs many times each day in the
entertainment industry. A writer completes a screenplay, convinced it is
the best work of his career. He places a call to the potential producer. The
producer's assistant, mindful of the demands on the boss' time, asks the
writer to send a treatment. The writer agrees, and within days the producer
receives a four-page outline. The producer passes on the treatment, but
within months, produces a film very similar to the story, characters, and
concept described in the treatment. The writer sues, feeling cheated. Does
the writer have a legitimate claim?
These are the basic facts of the California Supreme Court's landmark
decision in 1956 in the case of Desny v. Wilder.' In Desny, the plaintiff
alleged he "conceived, originated and completed" a literary and dramatic
composition about the life of Floyd Collins.2 In addition, the plaintiff
claimed he submitted the composition to the defendants "for the purpose of
sale," and that it was only to be used after the payment of adequate
compensation. Initially, the court noted the plaintiff must meet certain
requirements in order "to recover for a mere abstract, unprotectable idea.",
4
However, different requirements apply for-claiming a property right in a
* Glen L. Kulik is a founding member of the Century City, California law firm of Kulik,
Gottesman & Mouton, LLP. He specializes in entertainment industry litigation and has
represented parties in major copyright and idea submission cases.
1. 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
2. Id. at 260.
3. Id. at 260-61. In Desny, the writer prepared a treatment, called the producer's secretary,
read the treatment to her over the telephone, and she recorded it in shorthand verbatim. Id. at
261-62. The plaintiff alleged he submitted his "property" to the defendant for the purpose of
sale. Id. at 262. In considering the different causes of action asserted, including plagiarism,
quasi-contract, and implied-in-fact contract, the Court analyzed the case both from the
perspective of the literary material as a "property" and the separate disclosure of ideas which
happened to be incorporated in the literary property. See id. at 263-64.
4. Desny, 299 P.2d at 263.
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literary composition. 5 The court held that although an infringement claim
was not available for the "theft" of an idea, the plaintiff may assert an
express or implied contract claim.6
Desny spawned hundreds of cases in the thirty years following the
decision.7 Today, it is possible the outcome in Desny would be very
different. A plaintiff who makes these same allegations based on similar or
even identical facts is likely to face a very different outcome. A plaintiff,
for instance, must fight for months at great expense to survive the pleading
stage.8 Moreover, a defendant will immediately remove the case to federal
court, alleging the contract cause of action is a disguised copyright
infringement claim, subject to federal court jurisdiction.9 Once the case is
entrenched in federal court, the defendant will move to dismiss the claim,
contending it is preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976.10
Courts are arriving at inconsistent conclusions on
the issue, although a growing number of trial courts are finding preemption
of the contract claim if the ideas are described in a writing and are
submitted to the defendant.1  Preemption occurs even though the
submission may be accompanied, or even preceded, by an oral pitch.
12
California set the standard for protecting the disclosure of one's creative
ideas. 13 Therefore, it is ironic that with one of the largest entertainment
communities, the Central District of California seems to pose the greatest
threat to the continued viability of a Desny-type claim.14 The Ninth Circuit
5. Id.
6. Id. at 267. Prior to Desny, plaintiffs attempted to protect their ideas on a variety of
theories including common law copyright, plagiarism, conversion, unjust enrichment, and
contract. As discussed, infra, after Desny it was clear an idea was not protectable on any of these
theories except for breach of an express or implied contract. Subsequently, as is also discussed,
infra, courts in California recognized ideas were protectable on the basis of a breach of
confidence claim or breach of a fiduciary/confidential relationship. Thus, even though there are
still multiple theories available to protect an idea, when one refers to an "idea submission claim,"
the usual reference is to an implied-in-fact contract as described in Desny.
7. See, e.g., Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Ct. App. 1986); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc.,
198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1984); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct.
App. 1982); Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Ct. App. 1979); Fink v. Goodson-Todman
Enters., Ltd., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970); Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App.
1970); Donahue v. United Artists Corp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1969); Minniear v. Tors, 72
Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1968); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct.
App. 1966); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. Id.
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1331 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
11. See discussion infra Parts III-V.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. 00-02279, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662 (C.D.
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Court of Appeals, likely to hear any appeal on the issue emerging from
California, has never actually addressed the issue in a reported decision. 5
As a result, the outcome of a preemption argument depends on the
particular court in which the matter is pending, and on the particular judge
to whom the case is assigned. More often than not, what courts once
recognized as a viable claim under California law no longer exists.
Thus, a serious question arises as to whether today, ideas are still
protected under any theory. In reality, when one attempts to sell an idea for
a film or television program, the idea inevitably is memorialized in some
form of writing submitted to a studio, network, or production entity.
Business is conducted this way in virtually every case. Defendants can and
will argue that a plaintiffs sole cause of action is for copyright
infringement because anything reduced to writing is theoretically
copyrightable. Courts are presently split on this issue.' 6 However, if the
majority adopts this principle, it will, for all practical purposes, be the end
of idea submission cases and of the principles established in Desny.
II. THE HISTORICAL PROTECTION OF IDEAS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
Desny was the last in a series of cases decided by the California
Supreme Court between 1949 and 1956, establishing the protection of ideas
in California and elsewhere. 17  Prior to Desny, in Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting System,' 8 the plaintiff "prepared, composed and [wrote] an
original script for a radio program" and submitted it to the defendant.
19
Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (dismissing implied contract claim after removal to federal court); Selby v.
New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (dismissing implied contract
claim); Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1524 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (dismissing implied contract claim); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
816 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing removed implied contract claim).
15. In a recent unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted "[r]ights
created by contract do not create exclusive rights and thus a claim for inducing breach of contract
is normally not equivalent to the rights within the scope of the Copyright Act. However, this
circuit has not definitively ruled on this issue in the context presented by this appeal." Star Patrol
Enters., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., No. 95-56534, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29994, at *9 (9th Cir.
Oct. 23, 1997).
16. See infra Parts III-V.
17. Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953) (affirming implied contract cause of
action for use of literary composition); Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal.
1953) (affirming implied contract cause of action for radio program idea); Burtis v. Universal
Pictures Co., 256 P.2d 933 (Cal. 1953); Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal.
1950) (affirming implied contract claim for use of an idea for a radio program).
18. 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950).
19. Id. at 74.
2000]
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The defendant declined any interest in producing the script.
20
Subsequently, plaintiff alleged that a radio program later produced by the
defendant "substantially copied and embodied plaintiffs radio program
and, as a result, [defendant] became indebted to the plaintiff for the use
thereof."21  The Court held that the idea was potentially protected by an
implied-in-fact contract.22 Moreover, at the time it was decided, Stanley
was noteworthy for its holding that an idea must be "novel" to be protected
by contract.23  This requirement was later repudiated in Desny and in
24several subsequent decisions.
In Weitzenkorn v. Lesser,25 the plaintiff was the author of a screenplay
entitled "Tarzan in the Land of Eternal Youth." The plaintiff submitted the
screenplay to the defendant's production company "'pursuant to an express
oral understanding and agreement' that, in consideration of such
submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof and given the
customary screen credit as author if they should use all or any part of it."
26
While professing to have no interest in the material, the defendant later
produced a film entitled "Tarzan's Magic Fountain," allegedly "patterned
upon[,] [copying, and using]" the plaintiffs work.27  In considering the
defendant's demurrer, the court concluded the plaintiff could not protect
her ideas as a property right, but was entitled to proceed on her claims for
breach of oral contract and breach of implied-in-fact contract. 28
A common element shared by Weitzenkorn and Stanley is that the
plaintiffs in both cases alleged their ideas were contained in written form
and submitted to the defendants. 29 Today, these cases would immediately
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 75.
23. Id. Justice Traynor's dissenting opinion in Stanley argued novelty should not be a
requirement. Stanley, 221 P.2d at 85. This view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Desny and
since that time the law in California is that an idea need not be novel to be protected by contract.
See, e.g., Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970); Donahue v. Ziv Television
Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 142 (Ct. App. 1966).
24. See, e.g., Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating even though
an idea disclosed may be widely known and generally understood, it may be protected by
contract); Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970); Donahue v.
Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1966) (rejecting the proposition that
defendants can be contractually liable only if they use "novel" portions of plaintiffs submission).
25. 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953).
26. Id. at 950.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 959.
29. Id. at 950; Stanley, 221 P.2d at 74.
IS THIS THE END OF DESNY V. WILDER?
be removed to federal court where it is questionable that a court would ever
reach a decision on the merits of the plaintiffs' contract claims.
In truth, under California law, ideas may only be protected on an
implied-in-fact contract theory, but only in very limited circumstances.
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc. lists the most often cited requirements.3 °
First, the plaintiff must have an idea submitted to the defendant.3'
Additionally, the defendant must receive and have access to the plaintiffs
idea.32 The idea need not be novel,33 but from a practical perspective, it
must have some flesh and bone or the plaintiff will have a difficult time
prevailing at trial and recovering meaningful damages.
34
The second requirement is that the idea be disclosed for sale. 35 An
idea will not be protected if it is disclosed for any other purpose.36 For
example, in Faris v. Enberg,37 the plaintiff submitted a treatment disclosing
his idea for a new television game show to a man whom he hoped would be
interested in appearing as the show's host.38 The potential host declined
the offer, but later appeared as the host of a very similar show. 39 The court
held the plaintiff could not recover because the idea was not disclosed for
sale.4°
30. 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982). The court held the requirements for idea protection
are:
1. That plaintiff submitted her ideas to the defendants and that the defendants
received them. 2. That before plaintiff submitted her ideas to the defendants, she
clearly conditioned her disclosure upon defendants' agreement to pay for those
ideas of plaintiffs which the defendants used, if any. 3. That defendants knew, or
should have known, the condition upon which the disclosure was being made
before the disclosure was made. 4. That the defendants voluntarily accepted the
submission on plaintiffs terms and thereby impliedly agreed to pay plaintiff for any
of her ideas which they might use. 5. That in writing the script for the motion
picture "Shampoo," the defendants actually used plaintiff's ideas, that is, that the
defendants based the motion picture "Shampoo" substantially upon plaintiffs ideas
rather than on their own ideas or ideas from other sources. 6. That the ideas of
plaintiff which were used, if any, had value.
Id. at 533-34 n.6.
31. Id. at 533.
32. Id.
33. See Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (stating novelty is not required to enforce an implied
contract).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 533.
36. Id.
37. 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Ct. App. 1979).
38. Id. at 707.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 709. The court stated:
[P]laintiff never thought of selling his sports quiz show idea to anyone-including
20001
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The third requirement, is that before submitting the idea, the plaintiff
must condition the disclosure upon the defendant's agreement to pay for
the use of the idea.4' In other words, the plaintiff must prove the defendant
knew, or should have known, the condition for the idea submission. An
obligation to pay cannot be inferred from the mere fact that a submission is
made.42 Because an agreement to pay cannot be forced on the defendant,
the defendant, at a minimum, must have had an opportunity to reject the
submission before it was made.43
Finally, the plaintiff must prove the defendant actually used the
submitted ideas. 44 In Mann, the plaintiff wrote a twenty-nine page written
format entitled "Women Plus," allegedly submitted to the defendant for
sale.45  The defendant passed, but later produced the film "Shampoo. 46
The plaintiff then alleged the film was based on her format.47 In granting
the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court
noted, "[i]f the two defendants did not use [plaintiffs] ideas in the
'shooting script,' the fact that the motion picture may strongly resemble
[plaintiffs screenplay] does not afford plaintiff a cause of action against
Columbia for breach of an implied contract. 48 The court found conclusive
Enberg. He appears at all times to have intended to produce it himself, and sought
out Enberg, as a master of ceremonies. He obviously hoped to make his idea more
marketable by hiring a gifted sports announcer as his master of ceremonies. Not
only did Faris seek to induce Enberg to join him by showing him the product, but
also sought to entice him by promises of a "piece" of the enterprise for his
involvement. Plaintiff never intended to submit the property for sale and did not
tell Enberg that he was submitting it for sale. There is no reason to believe that
Enberg ... would have believed that Faris' submission was an offer to sell
something, which if used would oblige the user to pay.
Id.
41. Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 534 n.6.
42. Id. at 535. In Desny, the Court observed:
[S]uch inferred or implied promise, if it is to be found at all, must be based on
circumstances which were known to the producer at and preceding the time of the
disclosure of the idea to him and he must voluntarily accept the disclosure knowing
the conditions on which it was tendered .... The law will not imply a promise to
pay for an idea from the mere facts that the idea has been conveyed, is valuable, and
has been used for profit; this is true even though the conveyance has been made
with the hope or expectation that some obligation will ensue.
299 P.2d at 270.
43. Desny, 299 P.2d at 270 (stating no valid claim can exist "unless the offeree has an
opportunity to reject the consideration-he preferred conveyance of the idea-before it is
conveyed").
44. Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34 n.6.
45. Id. at 524.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 528.
48. Id. at 535.
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evidence that the defendant independently created its film, even though the
ideas were similar and the defendant may have had access to the plaintiffs
idea.49
As a result, to prevail in an idea submission case, the plaintiff must
prove a specific series of rigid facts that are difficult to prove even in the
best of cases. In contrast, none of these elements are required to prove
copyright infringement.5 °
Furthermore, the copyright owner receives protection for the material
as against the entire world.5' This protection extends whether the copyright
owner directly communicated with the defendant or not, and regardless of
whether that defendant agreed to respect the owner's interest.
52
Conversely, in an idea submission case, the relationship of the parties
is protected, rather than the nature of the disclosed information.53 A
contract creates rights only as between the contracting parties, and the only
possible defendant is the party to whom an idea was directly submitted for
sale. 54  As discussed below, these distinctions have received little or no
attention from courts finding idea submission claims are preempted by the
Copyright Act.
55
III. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 AND THE ELEMENTS OF AN
INFRINGEMENT CLAIM
The present federal copyright legislation was passed twenty years
after the California Supreme Court decided Desny. During that twenty year
period, California appellate courts repeatedly reaffirmed claims seeking to
protect the disclosure of ideas based on a contract theory.56 The last time
49. Id. at 535. A showing by the plaintiff of "access" and "similarity" can give rise to an
inference that the defendant used an idea. Id. at 534. However, the inference can be rebutted by
the defendant's showing of "independent creation." Id. In effect, a defendant can introduce
evidence that the access and similarity are a mere coincidence and that a defendant's work was
created without knowledge of, or resort to, a plaintiffs ideas.
50. Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., No. 99-55222, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22487, at *21 (9th
Cir. Sept. 6, 2000).
51. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. Desny, 299 P.2d. at 266. One cannot own a property interest in an idea. Id. at 265. An
idea can be protected, if at all, based on the contractual relationship of the parties. Id. at 266.
54. Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
55. See discussion infra Part IV.
56. See, e.g., Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1970) (holding plaintiff's idea
of filming Shakespeare's "Taming of the Shrew" is one that may be protected by contract);
Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1968) (holding the law protects ideas under certain
contractual circumstances).
2000]
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the California Supreme Court considered an idea submission case was in
1975.57 At that time, the court held an idea was also protectable on a
breach of confidence theory. 8
In Davies v. Krasna,5 9 the plaintiff "submitted his written story 'Love
Must Go On' to the defendant in confidence. 60  The defendant then
incorporated the "idea, central theme, and dramatic core of that story" into
his play "Who Was That Lady I Saw You With.",
61
The court noted, "[it] never ruled that a cause of action for breach of
confidence can rest upon a basis other than a contract that protects that
confidence. 62 The court concluded the defendant had an obligation not to
use or disclose the idea without the creator's consent because the plaintiff
submitted the idea to the defendant in confidence.63 The claim is treated as
a tort. 64 However, in California, the decision is limited by a subsequent
holding that the idea disclosed in confidence must be novel.65
The year after Davies was decided, Congress passed the Copyright
Act of 1976.66 On its face, the statute expressly provides copyright
protection is not afforded to ideas but only to the expression of those
ideas.67 Considerable litigation has ensued over what constitutes an idea
and what constitutes the expression of that idea.68 The relevant point for
purposes of this Article is that an idea is not protected by copyright law.69
57. Davies v. Krasna, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (Ct. App. 1975).
58. See Faris, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 711. A breach of confidence cause of action is a tort. Id. It
requires proof of a disclosure in confidence by one party to another. Id. It does not require there
be a "confidential relationship," only that a disclosure was made in confidence such that the
recipient of the disclosure was not free to use the information or disclose it to a third party
without the permission of the plaintiff. Id.
59. 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (Ct. App. 1975).
60. Id. at 706.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 707.
63. Id. at 709.
64. Id.
65. Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276, 280 (Ct. App.
1985). As discussed, infra, while there is a growing trend in the trial courts that implied-in-fact
contract claims are preempted, those same courts seem to conclude that breach of confidence
claims are not preempted. E.g., Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. 00-02279, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7662 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000).
66. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1331 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
67. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding copyright protects only an author's expression of an idea and not the idea itself);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
copyright protection extends only to the expression of an idea and not the idea itself).
68. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977). The court stated:
The real task in a copyright infringement action ... is to determine whether there
IS THIS THE END OF DESNY V. WILDER?
In general terms, § 301 of the Copyright Act preempts claims made
under state law that duplicate copyright infringement claims: "[W]orks of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression . . .come
within the subject matter of copyright... [and] any such right or equivalent
right in any such work [is precluded] under the common law or statutes of
any State., 70  The legislative history of the Copyright Act suggests that
Congress expressly considered the preemption issue. 71 "The intention of
section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or
statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works
coming within the scope of the federal copyright law."72 While the intent
of Congress in § 301 is clearly stated, the difficulty arises in determining
when state common law rights are "equivalent to copyright."
Moreover, the House Committee Report to the Copyright Act states
that contract claims are not preempted: "Nothing in the bill derogates from
the rights of parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of
contract., 73 Furthermore, the original version of the legislation expressly
provided that contract claims are not preempted.74  However, Congress
removed the provision from the Act prior to its passage.75
In National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Commuter Associates,
International,76 the defendant argued the final language of the statute
has been copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea itself... The
difficulty comes in attempting to distill the unprotected idea from the protected
expression. No court or commentator in making this search has been able to
improve upon Judge Learned Hand's famous "abstractions test."
Id. at 1163 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The so-called abstractions test is itself not very
helpful. "[Tihere is a point in this series of abstractions where [ideas] are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
69. See discussion infra Part IV.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
72. Id. at 130. As described, infra, it is this statutory language which gives rise to the two-
pronged test applied by federal courts in deciding whether copyright law preempts state law.
73. Id. at 132.
74. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., § 301(b)(3) (2d Sess. 1966). The bill states:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law
or statutes of any State with respect to ... activities violating rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106, including breaches of contract, breaches of trust, invasion
of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false
representation.
Id.
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1994).
76. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
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evidenced congressional intent to remove the "safe harbor" from breach of
contract preemption.77 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,
stating members of Congress were "concerned about the subsequent
addition of the tort of misappropriation to the list of non-preempted causes
of action, and suggested deletion of the specific examples in order to
prevent confusion about the scope of preemption. '78 Thus, the court relied
on the legislative history of the Copyright Act in holding Congress did not
intend to preempt breach of contract actions.
79
IV. STATE COURT APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
Following the passage of the Copyright Act, state courts began
determining when common law claims were subject to federal copyright
preemption. California courts appeared to have a clear understanding of
which claims were preempted. 80 In substance, claims based on a plaintiffs
alleged property interest are preempted because they regulate the same
general subject matter as the copyright legislation.
8'
77. Id. at 433.
78. Id. at 433-34. The court in National Car Rental cited the following excerpt from the
legislative history:
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment [deleting all of the latter part of section
301(b)(3) beginning with the word "including," followed by the examples of
nonpreempted state created rights]. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is intended to
save the "Federal preemption" of State law section which is section 301 of the bill,
from being inadvertently nullified because of the inclusion of certain examples in
the exemption from preemption .... [I]t would be a serious mistake to cite as an
example from preemption the doctrine of "misappropriation." The doctrine was
created by the Supreme Court in 1922 and it generally has been ignored by the
Supreme Court and the lower courts ever since. Inclusion of a reference to the
misappropriation doctrine in this bill, however, could easily be construed by the
courts as authorizing the States to pass misappropriation laws. We should not
approve such enabling legislation, because a misappropriation law could be so
broad as to render the preemption section meaningless.
Id. at 433-34 n.5 (citing 122 CONG. REC. H10910 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (statement of Rep.
Seiberling)). Thus, the court in National Car Rental concluded, "[this] amendment strik[es] the
examples merely to remove the specific reference to misappropriation." Id. at 434 n.5.
79. Id. at 433-34.
80. See Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding the Copyright
Act of 1976 preempted common law causes of action based upon unauthorized use occurring
after Jan. 1, 1978); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 (Ct. App. 1982)
(dismissing claims for plagiarism and quasi-contract because they involve property interests and
were therefore preempted); see also Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying
California law).
81. See id.
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However, there are no property interests in ideas because ideas are
only protected within the context of a particular relationship.82
Furthermore, the Copyright Act does not protect mere ideas.83 As a result,
state courts in California concluded that the Copyright Act did not preempt
contract claims to protect ideas.84
In Rokos v. Peck,85 the plaintiff writer composed a semi-
autobiographical two-part screenplay focusing on the life of a high school
student, her relationships, attempted suicide, and the revival of her will to
live.86 The writer sent a letter to the Suicide Prevention Center in Los
Angeles, where it received attention and a positive response from one of
the staff psychologists.87 The psychologist asked for and received
permission "to show [the] scripts to some local film/TV producer
friends."
88
In response, the writer forwarded copies of treatments for both scripts,
and gave the psychologist permission "to show [the] material to any...
film/TV producer friends who may be interested in the project., 89 The
psychologist returned the treatments three months later indicating he was
unable to generate any interest in the project. 90
A television "movie of the week" entitled "Last Cry for Help" aired in
January, 1979.91 The film was similar in many respects to the plaintiffs
ideas as described in her written material.92 The psychologist and the
Center were listed as technical consultants.93 The plaintiff sued for
plagiarism, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and unjust enrichment.
94
The court framed the issue as whether the relationship between the parties
resulted in the plaintiff "acquiring any right which could be pursued under
state law.",
95
82. See id.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
84. In fact, if one understands the law correctly, it is the relationship that is being enforced
rather than the idea which is being protected. Desny, 299 P.2d at 265.
85. 227 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Ct. App. 1986).
86. Id. at 482.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Rokos, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 481.
95. Id. at 484.
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First, the court concluded that a cause of action for plagiarism, as a
copyright claim, was preempted.96 The basis for the holding was that such
a claim "rests upon a showing that defendant produced a literary work
substantially similar to a protectable work of the plaintiff., 97 Therefore,
the plagiarism claim required the existence of a property right, the same
general subject regulated by the Copyright Act.
98
The court then examined in great detail the concept that ideas are
protectable by an implied-in-fact contract. 99 The court noted, "[a]bstract
ideas, however, are not now entitled to protection in an action for
plagiarism under either federal or state law."'100 Quoting the preeminent
copyright scholar, Professor Melville B. Nimmer ("Nimmer"), the court
pointed out that ideas are "free as air," and that copyright "does not
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the
author's work."''1 The court emphasized "a contract creates no monopoly;
it is effective only between the contracting parties; it does not withdraw the
idea from general circulation."'0 2 As a result, a non-party is not restricted
from using an idea. 10 3  However, a "widely known and generally
understood" idea may be protected by an express contract stating the idea
will be paid for "regardless of its lack of novelty."'
10 4
Finally, in concluding contract claims are not preempted, the court
noted "an implied-in-fact contract bears upon the relationship between the
individual parties and makes breaches of such agreements actionable
between parties because of the nature of their personal relationship."'
0 5
In Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc.,10 6 the plaintiff wrote and submitted a
novel at different times and in different ways to various defendants. 10 7 The
defendants ultimately produced a film entitled "The Deer Hunter."' 1 8 The
plaintiff alleged the film was based on his unpublished novel and sued for
96. See id. at 485.
97. Rokos, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 486.
100. Id. at 485.
101. Id. The Desny court discussed the concept that ideas are "free as air" absent a certain
relationship between the parties. 299 P.2d at 265.
102. Rokos, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 488.
106. 198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1984).
107. Id. at 298-99.
108. Id. at 299.
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plagiarism, quasi-contract, and breach of implied-in-fact contract. 0 9 The
plaintiff further sought the remedy of a constructive trust.' 10
The court noted that, to prove plagiarism, the plaintiff must show the
defendants copied "protectable material.""' As such, the Copyright Act
preempts these claims." 2 The court did not specifically address copyright
preemption of the contract claim, but assumed there was no preemption." 
3
The court simply addressed the contract claim on its merits, and held the
plaintiff could not prove the prima facie elements. 114
It is possible the Klekas court assumed the contract claim was not
preempted because of the recent California Court of Appeal decision in
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc. 15 The Mann court implicitly held that no
protectable interest was required to assert a contract claim. 1 6 Thus, the
property-based claims were dismissed while the contract claims
survived. 17 Similarly, in a decision that same year by the Second Circuit,
the court, applying California law, allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a
contract theory, but not on theories such as quasi-contract, unfair
competition, and plagiarism."18  Those claims "are actionable only to
vindicate legally protected property interests, and an idea is not recognized
as a property right."'"19
In substance, California courts originally concluded ideas do not
implicate federal copyright legislation because they are not subject to
ownership or to a property interest, and do not constitute protectable
expressions. 12  As such, a claim based on the relationship of the parties
rather than on a property interest is not preempted. Furthermore, it is noted
that contract claims do not create any exclusive rights as against the world,
and thus are not qualitatively the same as copyright protection.' 2' While
109. Id.
110. Id.
lIl. See id. at 301.
112. Klekas, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
113. Id. at 303-04.
114. Id. at 304.
115. 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982).
116. See id. at 526-27.
117. Id.
118. Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1984). In Whitfield, the plaintiff submitted
a completed script but claimed "an interest in the ideas contained in his script and seeks redress
for misappropriation of the ideas, not their literary or artistic expression." Id. There was no
discussion that the contract claim could be preempted because "an idea is not property and is not
subject to copyright under California law." Id.
119. Id.
120. See discussion supra Part II.
121. Id.
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the California courts have not directly addressed this issue in a number of
years,122 in a recent pronouncement in a slightly different context, the
California Court of Appeal suggested its original approach to the
preemption issue has not changed. In Durgom v. Janowiak,2 3 the court
recognized the complete preemption doctrine is an "independent corollary"
to the well-pleaded complaint rule. 124  However, the court held the
corollary did not apply, and that:
Federal copyright law does not completely preempt state law; it
preempts state law only to the extent state law purports to create
rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright". ... "State laws granting or
protecting other rights (such as breach of contract, conversion,
defamation, etc.) have not been preempted.'1
2 5
Thus, it is possible state appellate courts would conclude the Desny-type
claim is not preempted. However, because idea submission cases are now
regularly removed to federal court,12 6 it is unlikely state courts will address
the issue.
127
V. THE CASE FOR PREEMPTION OF IDEA SUBMISSION CLAIMS
The legislative history of the Copyright Act arguably underscores the
broad reach of preemption under § 301: "The intention of section 301 is to
preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a State
that are equivalent to copyright and extend to works coming within the
scope of the Federal copyright law."'128 Accordingly, in Del Madera
Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 129 the Ninth Circuit announced a
two-part test to determine whether the Copyright Act preempts state
122. In 1988, the court of appeal did address the claim of conversion. Maheu v. CBS, Inc.,
247 Cal. Rptr. 304, 309 (Ct. App. 1988). It was found that letters written by a famous person that
later formed the basis of a published book were copyrightable material and thus a claim for their
conversion in this context was preempted. Id.
123. 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619 (Ct. App. 1999). In Durgom, the plaintiff alleged the defendant
"failed to make payments ... pursuant to an assignment of royalties from the copyrighted song
'Nature Boy."' Id. at 620. Because the case involved copyright renewal rights, the defendant
contended the contract claim was preempted by the Copyright Act. Id. at 625. The court of
appeal disagreed. Id. at 625.
124. Id. ("Under this doctrine, 'once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted,
any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a
federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law."') (citation omitted).
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. See discussion supra Part III.
127. Durgom v. Janowiak, 87 Cal. Rptr 619, 625 (Ct. App. 1999).
128. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976).
129. 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987).
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statutory or common law claims.130  The court must decide whether the
claim: 1) involves a work within the "subject matter of copyright" and 2)
protects legal or equitable rights that are "equivalent to" (i.e., not
qualitatively different from) the exclusive rights protected by the Copyright
Act. 131
Those who oppose copyright preemption argue that because ideas are
not protected by copyright, they do not fall within the "subject matter of
copyright."1 32  In addition, these same parties argue a contract claim is
qualitatively different from a copyright claim because the contract claim
requires proof of an "additional element" in the form of a promise. 133 In
fact, it is arguable that in an implied-in-fact contract case, several
additional elements must be established that are irrelevant in a copyright
case. 134
In substance, opponents of the preemption argument point out that the
legal rights in a contract case are limited to the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and do not involve a monopoly against the
world as is the case in copyright. 35 Recent cases, however, illustrate how
proponents of the copyright preemption argument persuaded federal judges
against these seemingly logical arguments.
36
In Metrano v. Fox Broadcasting Co.,137 the plaintiff developed an
idea for a television series he referred to as "Beyond Belief."' 138  In
November 1995, he registered a treatment with the Writers Guild of
130. Id. at 976.
131. Id. at 976-77. This test is derived from the language of 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) and (3).
Id. at 976 n. 1. In Del Madera, it was alleged that "defendants misappropriated its time and effort
and used a copyrighted Tentative Map... to develop land previously owned by Del Madera
Properties." Id. at 975. The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, unfair competition and
unjust enrichment. id.
132. See discussion supra Part IV.
133. Del Madera Prods. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d, 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
134. According to one court, in a contract claim there are multiple extra elements including
"proof of the alleged contractual relationship, its terms, and the conduct that allegedly violated
those terms." Brown v. MoJo Records, No. CV-00-286-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9155, at *12
(D. Or. June 6, 2000).
135. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. CV-00-02279, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (holding an implied contract claim was preempted by federal copyright
law); Berge v. Bd. of Trs., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 916 (1997)
(holding the Copyright Act preempted a claim under Alabama law for conversion of intellectual
property).
137. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662.
138. Id. at *2.
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America in which he described the proposed series and sample stories.
139
In July 1996, the project was verbally pitched to the defendant, Katie Face
Productions.14  At the conclusion of the pitch meeting, the plaintiff left a
copy of his treatment and certain other materials with the defendant.
14 1
Subsequently, the defendant informed the plaintiff that he was not
interested in the project. 1
42
However, in 1999, the defendant commenced production on a
television series bearing a substantial similarity to the plaintiffs concept.1
43
The plaintiff sued for breach of implied-in-fact contract and breach of
confidence. 144 The defendant ignored the allegations in the complaint and
removed the case to federal court, based on the defendant's conclusion that
this was a disguised copyright case.1 45 The defendant then filed a motion to
dismiss on preemption grounds. 1
46
The court commenced its analysis by citing the Del Madera two-
pronged test discussed above. 147 The first issue was whether the plaintiffs
claims were within the subject matter of copyright law. 148 The plaintiff
argued the ideas were first presented orally to the defendant, and that the
written materials were delivered at the end of the pitch meeting. 149 The
court concluded there was no significance in the fact that the oral
presentation preceded delivery of the written material. 150 At the time of the
meeting, the ideas were embodied in written material given to the
defendant.'15  The court reasoned while the treatment may not constitute a
fully developed script, it was sufficiently detailed in its description of the
139. Id.
140. Id. at *2-3.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id.
143. Metrano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *3.
144. Id. at *4.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *8.
148. Id. at *9. The court explained:
State law claims are deemed to be within the general scope of copyright law if the
works on which the state law claim is based constitute "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed .. " Plaintiff created works when he fixed his concepts and ideas for
"Beyond Belief' in a treatment that was updated as well as in index cards and tapes.
Metrano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *9 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994)).
149. Id. at *10.
150. Id. at *13.
151. Id. at *10.
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plaintiff's ideas. 152 The treatment qualified for copyright protection
because it was in writing.'53
The court addressed whether an idea submission claim fell within the
general scope of copyright when ideas are specifically excluded from
copyright protection.1 54  Although the Ninth Circuit has not decided this
issue, the Fourth Circuit, in Berge v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama,155 held "ideas embodied in a work covered by the Copyright Act
fall within the subject matter of the Act because ... scope and protection
are not synonyms.' 56  The Berge court further noted, "[the] scope of the
Copyright Act's preemption was found to be considerably broader than the
scope of its protection."
' 57
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Berge allows proponents of
copyright preemption to satisfy the first prong of the test.1 58 Accordingly,
an idea contained in written material falls within the "scope," but not
within the "protection," of copyright law. 1
59
The court in Metrano proceeded to consider whether the contract
claim was equivalent to exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright.160 Initially, the court noted the Ninth Circuit "has not specified
when a breach of implied contract claim is preempted by the Copyright
Act." 6 1 The Metrano court also cited persuasive authority on both sides of
the issue.16  The court focused on the plaintiffs specific allegation that the
152. Id. at *13.
153. Id. at *13 n.3.
154. Metrano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *13 n.3.
155. 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 916 (1997).
156. Id. at 1463.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. In Berge, the plaintiff brought a claim under the False Claims Act alleging the
defendants made false statements to the National Institute of Health and in their periodic progress
reports required under the terms of the grants. Id. at 1456. The plaintiff wrote an unpublished
dissertation on the possible cause of low-birth weight in infants. Id. She alleged the defendants
copied her work in progress reports to the federal government. Id. at 1455-56. Among her
claims, the plaintiff sued for conversion of intellectual property under Alabama law. Id. at 1462.
The court noted the dissertation was in written form and thus subject to copyright protection. Id.
at 1463. The court addressed whether "there is an 'extra element' that changes the nature of the
state law action [for conversion] so that it is 'qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim."' Id. The court recognized conversion requires the plaintiff to prove theft of a property
interest. Id. at 1463. Therefore, it does not take a large leap to conclude that such a property
interest would fall within the scope of copyright protection.
160. Metrano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *14.
161. Id. at *15.
162. Id.; see Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding
the Copyright Act preempts breach of implied contract claims). But cf Desny v. Wilder, 299
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"defendant breached the implied contract when it used plaintiffs ideas for
'Beyond Belief in its production and broadcast of 'Guinness World
Records: Primetime."",163 As will be discussed below, this is the standard
allegation in any idea submission case.
Many courts have concluded the promise element makes a contract
claim qualitatively different from a copyright action.' 64  In Metrano,
however, the court asserted that "a suit for breach of a promise not to use
plaintiffs ideas without compensation does not require proof of any
element that is not required by the Copyright Act.' ' 165 The court did not
explain why a plaintiff must prove the existence of a promise in a copyright
action, 166 but cited Endemol Entertainment B. V. v. Twentieth Television,
Inc..'67 as authority for this proposition.'
68
In Endemol, the court struggled to explain why the promise does not
make a contract claim qualitatively different from a copyright claim. 169 Its
only explanation was that there must be a difference between breach of a
written contract and breach of an implied-in-fact contract. 70 Presumably,
breach of an implied-in-fact contract is a fiction that does not really require
proof of a promise.' 7' The merit of the Endemol court's distinction
P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956) (holding the Copyright Act does not preempt a breach of implied contract
claim).
163. Id. at *17.
164. See discussion infra Part VI.
165. Metrano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *17.
166. Id. at * 17-19. While the implied-in-fact contract claim was preempted, the court went
on to hold the breach of confidence claim was not preempted. Id. at *20. The court recognized
such a claim "is predicated on an understanding between parties that the information disclosed is
confidential and that the recipient of such information has a duty not to disclose that
information." Id. at *19. According to the court, understanding confidentiality "is an extra
element that takes a breach of confidence claim outside the scope of copyright protection." Id.
The defendant countered the confidentiality came from the same implicit agreement that gave rise
to the implied-in-fact contract claim. Id. at *23-25. The court was unmoved, holding the
required confidentiality made this claim qualitatively different from a copyright claim. Metrano,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *20.
167. 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1524 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
168. Metrano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7662, at *19.
169. See Endemol, 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1528.
170. Id.
171. See id. The court stated:
Plaintiff argues that cases construing breach of implied-in-fact contract claims have
expressly held that contract rights are not equivalent rights to those protected by
copyright laws because they involve an agreement between the parties rather than a
"right against the world." There is support for the notion that rights protected in
contracts may be different from those rights protected by copyright law. However,
these cases involved written contracts that had specific promises that provided an
"extra element" beyond copyright law protections.
Id. (citations omitted).
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between written contracts and implied-in-fact contracts is questionable in
light of California law, which requires proof of a promise for both forms of
contract.
In Canter v. West Publishing Co., Inc.,' 72 the court rejected the
reasoning in Endemol and in a similar case, Worth v. Universal Pictures,
Inc. 173 The Canter court stated, "[a] cause of action for breach of a contract
implied-in-fact.., requires proof of conduct that evinces an actual
agreement of the parties. This extra element of the parties' agreement
defeats Copyright Act preemption."
' 74
Both Worth and Endemol were based on the following erroneous
statement of the law: "[A] breach of an implied contract is a species of
quasi contract and is to be deemed an 'equivalent right' for determining
preemption .... This type of contract is preempted insofar as it relates to
the copyrighted material."' 75 California law is absolutely clear that quasi-
contract and implied-in-fact contract are two entirely different species. 1
76
An implied-in-fact contract is a form of express contract requiring a
promise and an agreement between the parties. 177 On the other hand, quasi-
contract is a legal fiction that is the equivalent of a property right, long held
as preempted by the Copyright Act. 78 As a result of this distinction, the
Canter court expressly rejected the decision in Worth stating, "[t]his court
declines to follow Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc. It appears the court in
Worth erroneously equated implied-in-fact contracts with quasi-
contract." 179
The Endemol court emphasized its ruling "is limited to the facts of
this case."'180  However, this has little meaning because virtually every
implied-in-fact contract case will arise in similar circumstances. The court
limited the reach of its decision fearing wiping out the Desny-type claim. 181
It further explained Desny and Rokos stand for the proposition that the state
law remedy for breach of contract is viable only when one does not have a
172. No. C-9-620440, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3815 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1999).
173. 5 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
174. Canter, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3815, at *17. The court in Worth mistakenly equated
quasi-contracts with implied-in-fact contracts, leading to the arguably incorrect statement that
implied-in-fact contracts are a mere species of quasi-contract.
175. Worth, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 822 (citations omitted).
176. B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 12 (9th ed. 2000).
177. Id.
178. Canter, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3815, at *17.
179. Id.
180. 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1527.
181. Id.
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sufficient "property interest" to merit copyright protection. 182  Yet, this
explanation is problematic because in both Desny and Rokos, and in other
California cases, the "ideas" were contained within copyrightable material
submitted to the various defendants. 
183
The Endemol court acknowledged "the purpose of this state cause of
action is not to provide a remedy in addition to the federal one, but rather to
protect those plaintiffs whose interest in literary property is not concrete
enough to be protectable under the laws of [copyright infringement].' 84
Again, both Desny and Rokos do not indicate the literary properties were
not sufficiently concrete.1 85 The plaintiffs in Desny and Rokos sued on a
state law theory because the idea, rather than the expression of the idea,
was allegedly misused.
18 6
VI. THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION OF IDEA SUBMISSION
CLAIMS
Depending on the forum, the case against copyright preemption has
been made under either prong of the Del Madera test. 187 As one court
recently recognized, a majority of forums hold contract-based claims are
not preempted because one prong of the test cannot be met:' 
88
[S]ome cases ... appear to stand for the broad proposition that it
is the promise inherent in contract arrangements that it is the
"extra element" that saves contract claims from preemption.
Under this theory, "a breach of contract claim is not
preempted"... because, unlike claims for copyright
infringement, claims based on a contract will involve the extra
element of a promise by one party to another... . Other
holdings are more narrow [determining] ... that the contract
right in question was not equivalent to any of the exclusive
copyright rights. 1
89
182. Id.
183. See discussion supra Parts II & IV.
184. Endemol, 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1527.
185. Id.
186. See discussion supra Parts II & IV.
187. See discussion supra Part IV.
188. Lennon v. Seaman, 63 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
189. Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted); see also Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc.,
935 F. Supp. 425, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating a promise in a contract case is an extra
element that prevents breach of contract actions from copyright preemption); National Car Rental
Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the contract
right in question was not equivalent to any right granted under copyright).
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In Brown v. Mojo Records,'9" plaintiffs were former members of a
rock band known as "The Cherry Poppin' Daddies."' 91 The plaintiffs
alleged they had an oral contract with the other band members in which
they would share all revenue generated by songs written and performed.
192
The defendant members of the band ultimately refused to share the
revenue, and the plaintiffs sued.' 93 The defendants argued the contract
claim was preempted by the Copyright Act.
194
The court held contract rights are not preempted because they are not
equivalent to the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act. 195 The
court stated a contract claim has an "extra element" that makes it different
from copyright infringement.196 The extra element "consists of proof of the
alleged contractual relationship, its terms, and the conduct that allegedly
violated those terms."' 97 The court held state law, not the copyright statute,
provides "guidance in analyzing the existence, terms, and breach of a
contract and such claims should not be preempted by federal law."',
9 8
Similarly, Nimmer noted contract claims require proof of an "extra
element" that should allow them to escape copyright preemption:
[A] breach of contract action (whether such contract involves a
mere idea or a fully developed literary work) is not predicated
upon a right that is "equivalent to any of [sic] the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright .... " This [sic] for
the reason that a contract right may not be claimed unless there
exists an element in addition to the mere acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution or display. The additional element is a
promise (express or implied) upon the part of the defendant. 199
In Dielsi v. Falk,200 the plaintiff worked as a speech coach for the lead
actor in the television series "Columbo.,, 20  He wrote a script for a
190. No. CV-00-286-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91i55 (D. Or. June 6, 2000).
191. Id. at*l.
192. Id. at *10.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *7.
195. Id. at *12.
196. Brown v. Mojo Records, No. CV-00-286-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9155, at *12.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *12-13.
199. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.04[C], at
16-25 (2000) [hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER] (quoting Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber,
893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990)).
200. 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
201. Id. at 987.
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potential episode and submitted it to the show's producer. 2  The plaintiff
alleged the script was later used as the basis for an episode for which he
was neither credited nor compensated.0 3  He sued for copyright
infringement, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence, and
conversion.20 4
The court held the conversion claim was preempted because it
involved physical deprivation of property. 20 5 However, the court found the
claims for breach of confidence, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation
were not preempted 20 6 because those claims are "qualitatively different"
from the rights sought to be protected by the Copyright Act in that they
require proof of an "additional element., 20 7 The plaintiffs claims were
found viable even though the script was plainly copyrightable.20 8
The court in Dielsi relied in part on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney.20 9 In Valente-Kritzer, the plaintiffs
fraud claim was founded on an allegation that the defendant misrepresented
its intent to perform a contract. 210 The Ninth Circuit held the fraud claim
was not preempted by the Copyright Act because the plaintiff must prove
the "additional element" of misrepresentation.2 1
In Trenton v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.,212 the plaintiff, a radio talk
show host, alleged he conceived and owned a format for a radio
program.21 3 According to the plaintiff, his format featured novel program
techniques and presentation methods for a program he called "Loveline. 21 4
The station for whom the plaintiff worked began airing the program, which
became a huge success. 215  Eventually, the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant radio station soured.216 The plaintiff was
suspended several times for violating station policy. 21 7  During the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 990-92.
206. Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp., 985, 990-92.(C.D. Cal. 1996).
207. Id. at 991-92.
208. Id. at 992.
209. Id. at 992 & n.3.
210. Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d at 776 (9th Cir. 1989).
211. Id.
212. 865 F. Supp. 1416 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
213. Id. at 1418.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1420.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1420-21.
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plaintiffs final suspension, the defendant announced a new permanent host
of the show.2t 8 The plaintiff sued on several state law theories, including
breach of both express and implied contract.21 9 Predictably, the defendant
removed the case to federal court.
22 0
Addressing the numerous state law claims, the court noted, "to
survive preemption, the essence of a state law cause of action must derive
from something beyond the alleged unauthorized use of a copyrighted
work, and must protect rights qualitatively different from the assertion of
copyright rights.122' The court, citing Nimmer,222 held the act of
reproduction or display itself is not enough to constitute a violation of state
law.223 The claim is preempted unless other elements are proven "instead
of or in addition to" the acts of reproduction or display.224
The court also noted nine of the claims involved property rights.
225
Consequently, the court held all of the property-based claims as preempted
because they "merely assert[ed] a protectable copyright interest in the
Loveline format and defendants' unauthorized use thereof."226 Thus, these
claims do not qualitatively differ from a copyright claim.
The court addressed the plaintiffs twelve claims arising out of
contract law.227 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged his employers expressly
and impliedly agreed to compensate him for his ideas.228 The court held
such contract-based claims, unlike property claims, were not preempted
because "the contract-based causes of action do allege more than the
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work., 22 9 The court, discussing the
breach of contract claim, noted the qualitative difference between breach of
contract and copyright infringement actions. 230 Thus, by not asserting a
copyright claim, the plaintiff successfully brought his state law claim based
on breach of contract alone.23' In reaching this result, the Trenton court, in
effect, adopted a rule that a plaintiff is the master of the complaint, and can
218. Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. at 1421.
219. Id. at 1429.
220. Id. at 1418.
221. Id. at 1428.
222. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 199, § 1.01[B][l], at 1-12 (2000).
223. Trenton, 865 F. Supp. at 1428.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1429.
228. Id.
229. Trenton, 865 F. Supp. at 1429.
230. Id.
231. Id.
2000]
24 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1
choose whether to sue for copyright infringement or for breach of contract
to protect an idea.232
In Berkla v. Corel Corp.,233 the plaintiff sued for copyright
infringement and on pendent state law theories, including breach of
contract and breach of confidence. 4 The court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant on the copyright claim, but held the state law
claims were not preempted. 235  The court explained, "[p]rotection from
breach of contract ... is not equivalent to copyright protection because a
contract claim requires an extra element ... a promise by the
defendant .... ,,236 The court noted the promise element makes breach of
contract claims qualitatively different from copyright infringement claims
which do not require a promise.237
In addition to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Valente-Kritzer, at least
five other federal circuit courts recognize that claims based on the
relationship of the parties, such as breach of contract, are not preempted. 8
For instance, in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,239 the plaintiff sued to enforce a
license agreement that allowed the defendant to use the plaintiffs
copyrightable material. 240 The defendant contended the Copyright Act
preempted the claim.241 The controlling issue was whether rights created
by contract were "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright., 242 The court answered as follows:
Three courts of appeals have answered "no." The district court
disagreed with these decisions, but we think them sound. Rights
''equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright" are rights established by law-rights that
restrict the options of persons who are strangers to the
author .... A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts,
232. See, e.g., id.
233. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
234. Id. at 1150.
235. Id. at 1151.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citations omitted).
238. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); National Car Rental
Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1992); Computer Assocs. Int'l. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488
(5th Cir. 1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
239. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
240. Id. at 1450.
241. Id. at 1447.
242. Id. at 1454.
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by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do
as they please, so contracts do not create "exclusive rights. 243
The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court decision to dismiss the claim
on preemption grounds.2 "
Likewise, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,245
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the Copyright Act did not
preempt claims for breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and theft
of trade secrets.246 In remanding the action, the court explained, "[a] state
law claim is not preempted if the 'extra element' changes the 'nature of the
action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim."'' 247 The court went on to state "many state law rights that can arise
in connection with instances of copyright infringement satisfy the extra
element test, and thus are not preempted . ,248
A recent decision, Katz Dochtermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box
Office,249 confirmed that this remains the rule in the Second Circuit. 21° In
Katz, the court held a claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract was not
preempted because an "implied promise to pay for its idea is entirely
separate and apart from any claim for copyright infringement involving the
literary work.,
251
The trial courts, including those in the Central District of California,
have not uniformly concluded federal law preempts implied-in-fact
contract claims. For example, in Miller v. Miramax Film Corp., 252 the
court denied a motion to dismiss such a claim.253 In that case, the plaintiffs
alleged that they orally presented ideas to the defendants, and then
submitted a completed script.254 Defendants passed, but later produced the
motion picture "Shakespeare In Love," which won major awards for its
243. Id. (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 1455.
245. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
246. Id. at 720.
247. Id. at 716.
248. Id. at 717.
249. 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1957, 1959 (S.D. Il. 1999) (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)).
250. Id. at 1959.
251. Id. at 1960.
252. No. CV 99-08526 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1999) (order granting in part and denying in part
defendants' motion to dismiss).
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id. at 2.
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original screenplay. 255  The plaintiffs sued alternatively for copyright
infringement and for breach of implied-in-fact contract.
25 6
The court noted because the Copyright Act does not protect ideas, "it
is arguable that unfixed ideas are outside the subject matter of copyright for
purposes of preemption. ' '257  The court also acknowledged two of the
Fourth Circuit's conclusions in Berge:258 1) "the shadow actually cast by
the Act's preemption is notably broader than the wing of its protection"
259
and 2) the court did not need to decide the issue because the contract claim
did not assert rights equivalent to those protected by copyright.260
On the latter issue, the court recognized the "contractual claim in this
case raises a closer question, because it involves an alleged promise to
refrain from using ideas without compensation., 261 However, the deciding
factor was the court's recognition that contracts only regulate relations
between the contracting parties. 262 Contracts do not create monopolies or
"exclusive rights." Thus, the "rights asserted by a contract claim are...
not the exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Act.,
263
In Leaf v. Revelations Entertainment, the court in the Central District
of California found federal law does not preempt an implied-in-fact
contract claim.26  In that case, a writer alleged he faxed his idea to a
production entity in response to an advertisement in a trade magazine for
new material.26 5 The producer called, expressed an interest, and requested
written material.26 6 The writer sent a treatment that the producer ultimately
rejected.267 Within months, however, the producer began production on a
similar project.268 The defendant removed the case to federal court, and the
plaintiff moved to remand.26 9
255. Id. at 1-2.
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id. at 6.
258. 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997).
259. Id. at 7 (quoting Berge v. Bd. of Trs., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997)).
260. Id. at 7.
261. Id. at 8.
262. Id. at 9.
263. Id.
264. No. CV 99-6505 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 30 1999) (order remanding case to Superior Court for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
265. Id. at 3.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 4.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 4-5.
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Despite the letter and the treatment, the court granted the motion to
remand, concluding that, in these circumstances, the Copyright Act does
not preempt a state law claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract.27 °
VII. THE IMPACT ON THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IF CONTRACT
CLAIMS ARE PREEMPTED
As previously discussed, each of the plaintiffs in Desny, Weitzenkorn,
and Stanley, submitted ideas to the defendants in written material. 271 The
same situation existed in two other cases discussed above, Mann and
Faris.272  In each of these cases, the screenplay, treatment, outline, or
format could have been copyrighted by the author, although the facts of the
cases do not indicate whether the plaintiff's works were in fact
copyrighted.
There is no meaningful way to distinguish the facts of these cases
from the facts of the cases discussed in Part II, where courts found
copyright law preempts contract claims. Thus, the threat to the continued
viability of the idea submission cause of action is imminent and clear.
In fact, it can be demonstrated that virtually every reported decision in
California dealing with the protection of ideas on a contract theory could
potentially be preempted if the cases were decided today. For example, in
one of the earliest idea submission cases, Yadkoe v. Fields,273 the plaintiff
wrote skits and comedy routines and submitted them to comedian/actor
W.C. Fields for consideration.274  Fields used at least a portion of the
material in his subsequent work.275 The jury found for the plaintiff and
awarded damages based on the reasonable value of the ideas used.276
Because the author presented the ideas to Fields in written form, today, the
plaintiff would have to sue for copyright infringement.
In Chandler v. Roach,277 the plaintiff, a professional writer, conceived
an idea for a television program based on the activities of a public
defender's office.2 78 His agent met with the defendant, Hal Roach, a well-
known producer, and "gave Roach both an oral and written summary of
270. Leaf v. Revelations Entm't, No. CV 99-6505 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 30 1999) (order remanding
case to Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
271. See discussion supra Parts 1-11.
272. See id.
273. 151 P.2d 906 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
274. Id. at 907.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 319 P.2d 776 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
278. Id. at 778.
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Chandler's idea., 279 The defendant expressed considerable interest in the
idea leading to a series of meetings in which Roach asked the plaintiff to
write a script.28° The plaintiff submitted a script to the defendant, who
eventually said he would not produce the series because "it was too good
an idea.",281  The defendant thereafter produced a series of sixty-nine
television episodes that appeared to be "along the lines suggested by
Chandler. ' 282 Today, this case might be immediately removed to federal
court, where it could be dismissed. However, in 1957, a Los Angeles
Superior Court allowed Chandler to go to a jury.283
In Donahue v. United Artists Corp. 284 the plaintiff wrote a television
format for a proposed series entitled "The Underwater Legion."2 85 The
plaintiff sent twelve story outlines, one screenplay, and a proposed budget
286to the defendant production entity. The defendant passed on the project,
but thereafter produced a successful television series entitled "Sea Hunt.,
287
At trial, the jury rendered a $200,000 verdict for the plaintiff 82 Today,
this case might not get past the pleading stage because the format, outlines,
and script were all copyrightable. Thus, it is questionable whether one
could sue based on the defendant's misuse of ideas contained in those
written materials.
In Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd.,289 the plaintiff
developed an idea for a television series and drafted a written
presentation.29 The presentation included a central theme, a detailed
exposition, various portrayal techniques, and the plots for fifteen of thirty-
nine weekly episodes.2 91 The plaintiff also submitted a script of the initial
episode and completed scripts for seven additional episodes.292 The trial
court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed.293 Today,
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 319 P.2d at 778.
284. 83 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1969).
285. Id. at 133.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 136.
289. 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970).
290. Id. at 682.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 695.
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given the fact that the plaintiffs ideas were submitted in written form,
some courts would not allow the case to proceed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is profound disagreement at the trial court level on whether,
and to what extent, the Copyright Act preempts contract claims seeking to
protect the disclosure of creative ideas. Neither the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals nor the United States Supreme Court has squarely addressed the
issue. In fact, while a number of federal courts of appeals have generally
held that contract claims are not preempted, none have directly addressed
the issue in the context of a Desny-type claim. Specifically, there is no
such decision involving a situation where a writer submits an idea for a
film or television program, and the production entity rejects the submission
but later produces a film using the writer's idea. The legislature has yet to
clarify its intent in the face of this significant conflict between the courts.
The importance of the issue cannot be overstated. While other claims
may protect the disclosure of an idea, those claims are even more limited
than implied-in-fact contract claims under California law. Therefore, if
implied-in-fact contract claims are not available, and copyright does not
protect ideas, then a producer can, in most cases, virtually steal an idea
leaving the writer without recourse.
The case in favor of preemption is somewhat suspect. To show a
contract claim falls within the general subject matter of copyright requires
courts to adopt the Berge view; namely, even though copyright cannot
cover an idea, the scope of its subject matter is broader than the scope of its
protection.294 This is a very liberal interpretation of the copyright statute
and the legislative history. More troubling, however, is the argument that a
contract claim is not qualitatively different from a copyright claim.295
Courts that have found them to be the same have simply misinterpreted and
misapplied the law when equating implied-in-fact contracts with quasi-
contracts. In fact, the law is absolutely clear that an implied-in-fact
contract is a real contract with the same elements as a written or express
296oral contract. The only difference is the manner of proof. Thus, those
courts that distinguish written contracts from implied-in-fact contracts are
guilty of suspect reasoning in holding the latter is a species of quasi-
contract.
297
294. See discussion supra Part V.
295. See discussion supra Part V.
296. See discussion supra Part V.
297. See discussion supra Part V.
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In a contract claim, whether the contract is written, oral, or implied-
in-fact, the plaintiff must prove a promise, the terms of the contract,
consideration, and so forth. It is illogical to conclude these are not "extra
elements" that make such claims qualitatively different from copyright
protection. Unlike a contract, with a copyright, the author enjoys the
exclusive right of having a monopoly as against the world. Even though
the act of breaching the contract and infringing the copyright can arise from
the same incident, these causes of action are qualitatively different.
At the moment, the courts are literally awash with contract claims that
end up in federal court, necessitating costly and time consuming remand
motions and motions to dismiss. As such, it is imperative that the Ninth
Circuit, the United States Supreme Court, and/or Congress remedy this
conflict. Wiping out the Desny-type claim via federal preemption will
effectively eliminate an author's legitimate breach of contract claim, and
result in the wholesale theft of an author's ideas.
